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Abstract
Background: Although primary health care, and in particular, general practice will be at the frontline in the response to
pandemic influenza, there are no frameworks to guide systematic planning for this task or to appraise available plans for
their relevance to general practice. We aimed to develop a framework that will facilitate planning for general practice, and
used it to appraise pandemic plans from Australia, England, USA, New Zealand and Canada.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We adapted the Haddon matrix to develop the framework, populating its cells through a
multi-method study that incorporated the peer-reviewed and grey literature, interviews with general practitioners, practice
nurses and senior decision-makers, and desktop simulation exercises. We used the framework to analyse 89 publicly-
available jurisdictional plans at similar managerial levels in the five countries. The framework identifies four functional
domains: clinical care for influenza and other needs, public health responsibilities, the internal environment and the macro-
environment of general practice. No plan addressed all four domains. Most plans either ignored or were sketchy about non-
influenza clinical needs, and about the contribution of general practice to public health beyond surveillance. Collaborations
between general practices were addressed in few plans, and inter-relationships with the broader health system, even less
frequently.
Conclusions: This is the first study to provide a framework to guide general practice planning for pandemic influenza. The
framework helped identify critical shortcomings in available plans. Engaging general practice effectively in planning is
challenging, particularly where governance structures for primary health care are weak. We identify implications for practice
and for research.
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Introduction
Primary health care, and in particular general practice, will be
at the frontline in the response to pandemic influenza. Prepared-
ness planning for this sector has lagged behind public health
planning, despite evidence from SARS [1,2] and influenza
epidemics [3] of the important role played by general practice.
Preparedness may be defined as the capacity to respond to a range
of public health threats including natural disasters and infectious
disease outbreaks, human-caused accidents and intentional attacks
[4]. There is an increasing recognition of the need for an ‘all-
hazards’ approach to planning that integrates acute clinical care,
public health, and emergency management systems [4]. Since
September 2001, the US government has invested about $5 billion
to upgrade preparedness plans for emergency management
systems [5,6].
There are three challenges for pandemic planning by general
practice. First, there is no systematic framework for planning this
sector’s response. Preparing for health threats and emergencies is
an essential function of public health, but is not core business for
general practice. Second, the way in which ambulatory health
services will interact with each other and with the broader health
system response to a pandemic is unclear. General practitioners
(GPs) in Canada [7], Australia [8] and the UK [9] have expressed
uncertainty about how to participate in such a response. Third,
planning and implementing changes for pandemic influenza across
the health system is complex. Although there is little evidence
linking specific preparedness activities to effective system-wide
responses to pandemic influenza [5,6], change management
theories point to a need for dynamic partnerships between general
practices and other ambulatory care services, hospitals and public
health departments [10]. The strength and structure of these
linkages vary around the world, depending on decentralisation
processes, the regulatory and legal system, and financing within
health systems [11,12]. Although general practice, or family
medicine, is organised differently in different countries, there is
considerable potential for transferable learning at the meso-level of
management planning [11].
We aimed to develop a framework that will facilitate systematic
planning for the general practice response to pandemic influenza
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and used it to appraise coverage of key elements in publicly
available pandemic plans from Australia, England, USA, New
Zealand and Canada.
Methods
Development of the framework
To guide planning and to appraise available plans, we adapted
the Haddon Matrix, a planning tool developed in the field of
injury research and intervention [13], and more recently applied
to the public health response to bioterrorism, SARS [14], and
pandemic influenza [15]. The matrix consists of a grid of columns
of four factors (human, agent, and physical and organisational
environment) impacting upon the event [15]. Pandemic influenza
may be perceived as a form of injury on a mass scale and the
matrix helps us understand the multi-dimensional nature of
epidemics and of the associated challenges that could be expected
by general practice. The framework can be readily shared with
public health units and other parts of the health system, as it
identifies the general practice contributions to primary health care
services and to public health surveillance and control. Because all
disasters are local, the matrix is flexible enough to allow a focused
analysis of the smallest unit of study, such as an individual, or
group of general practitioners.
The methods used to construct the cells of the modified Haddon
matrix have been detailed elsewhere [16]. In brief, a team with
expertise in social science, public health and general practice
reviewed objectives and strategies in WHO guidelines for
preparing and responding to a pandemic [17] to define the
context and potential contributions of general practice. Next, we
undertook a narrative review of the peer-reviewed and grey
literature on pandemic influenza to identify papers that elaborated
strategies relevant for general practice. A search of the peer-
reviewed literature through PubMed using the terms ‘general
practice’, ‘family physician’, ‘family medicine’ and various
combinations of the terms ‘influenza’, ‘epidemic’, ‘preparedness’
and ‘pandemic’ yielded 24 eligible papers from 157 search results .
The process of constructing the framework and populating the
cells was informed by organisational theories that emphasise
multilevel approaches to change from the individual to the
broader health system [10,18], and by methods for measuring [5]
and improving the quality [6] of public health emergency
preparedness.
Testing the framework
We tested our framework through interviews with a purposive
sample of health professionals engaged in pandemic planning.
Nineteen general practitioners and practice nurses with expertise
in pandemic planning were nominated by the two participating
Divisions of General Practice, each of which was a national leader
in disaster preparedness and response. Eight general practice
policy leaders were identified by representative organisations
(Australian Medical Association, Royal Australian College of
General Practitioners, Australian General Practice Network).
Group interviews were held with 14 state and territory public
health leaders attending a national pandemic preparedness
meeting. We held two workshops, attended by representatives of
state and territory health services, Commonwealth policymakers,
non-government organisations, and general practice organisations.
In addition, we conducted two focus groups of GPs and nurses
working in aged care in two cities. Finally, we undertook four
desktop exercises [19] attended by 25 GPs, 11 practice nurses and
10 administrative staff.
Assessment of general practice coverage in pandemic
plans
The five countries in this study had national response plans.
Contextualised detail about health-sector responses is contained in
plans at the level of administrative decentralisation where decisions
are made about patient-service groupings including general
practice. In practice, this level was the state or provincial health
departments in Federal systems where those jurisdictions have
responsibility for health service management and planning (USA,
Canada, and Australia). In England, the managerial level for
health services is located at the Primary Care Trust (PCT), while
in New Zealand it occurs at the level of the District Health Board.
Although these are not identical loci of health service governance,
they were sufficiently similar in the planning aims for comparisons
to be drawn.
Plans were obtained from websites of health departments of states
or provinces (USA, Australia, Canada), District Health Boards (New
Zealand) and PCTs (England) (Figure S1). For New Zealand and
England, publicly available records of Board Meetings were also
examined. Consumer information and isolated sub plans (e.g. for
infection control) were excluded. Plans for 95 jurisdictions were
identified; six were excluded as they addressed isolated aspects such
as only the distribution of medications, or communication with the
public, leaving 89 plans suitable for analysis.
Of the five countries, Canada exhibits the most variation
between provinces in health system coordination. We examined
the websites of Canada’s 84 provincial regional health authorities
(RHAS, 14 plans identified) and Ontario’s 36 public health units
(26 plans identified) and 14 Local Health Integration Networks (no
pandemic plans identified). We excluded the RHA and public
health unit plans from inter-country quantitative analysis, as their
level of devolution and/or responsibilities for health management
differed from those examined in the other four countries, but have
included descriptive details from some of the RHA plans where
they illustrate innovative approaches.
All plans were examined by two clinicians, and searched for the
following terms: primary care, primary health, ambulatory, general
practice, general practitioner, GP, family practice, family physician.
The roles of general practice/family practice in the plans were
assessed across the four domains of general practice identified in the
first part of this project. No attempt was made to quantify the extent
of coverage of general practice in the plans as this rarely extended
beyond a few sentences. Where there was detailed coverage of an
issue, we analysed the text and the health system context.
The study was approved by the Australian National University
Human Research Ethics Committee and the National Research
and Evaluation Ethics Committee of the Royal Australian College
of General Practitioners. Written informed consent was obtained
from participants.
Results
A conceptual framework of the general practice response to
pandemic influenza is shown in Table 1.
The framework identifies four domains of practice: clinical
services, public health responsibilities of general practice, internal
(physical and organisational) environment of the general practice
unit, and the macro-environment of general practice. In each
domain, we list the key challenges to be anticipated by general
practice during an influenza pandemic, and the type of responses
that need to be addressed in the plan.
Table 2 summarises the organisational levels in the five
countries, the proportion of jurisdictions with accessible pandemic
plans, and coverage of general practice in these plans. While
General Practice Pandemic Plan
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almost all plans from US jurisdictions were accessible, three
quarters of Australian states/territories and one third of New
Zealand’s District Health Boards had accessible plans. Only 13%
(20/152) of England’s PCTs had pandemic plans available in the
public domain.
Figure S1 shows the jurisdictions and health management
systems whose plans were included in this study; they comprise 49
jurisdictions from the USA, 20 from England, 8 from Canada, and
6 each from Australia and New Zealand.
Table 3 shows the number and rates of coverage of each of the
four domains of the general practice response in jurisdictional
plans of the five countries. The domain covered most frequently
was influenza-related clinical care (in all plans from England and
Canada). Overall less than half the plans mentioned non-influenza
clinical care, with the exception being England, where 90% of
PCT plans mentioned non-influenza clinical care. Public health
surveillance was addressed in all plans from Canada and New
Zealand and infection control in general practice in almost all
plans from England and Canada. Functional linkages of general
practice with other parts of the health system were addressed in
almost all the English plans, but a smaller proportion of other
plans.
Table 1. Conceptual framework of the general practice response to pandemic influenza
Domain of practice Challenges anticipated during a pandemic
Responses to be addressed in the general practice pandemic
plan
Clinical services Surge in demand for primary care services for influenza Ways to enhance surge capacity for responding to influenza
Sustaining other urgent or essential primary care services Maintaining other urgent and essential clinical services
Public health responsibilities Effective surveillance of acute respiratory infections Contributing data and specimens for clinical and laboratory-based
surveillance
Implementing influenza control measures Assisting public health units with contact tracing and monitoring
people in isolation or quarantine, dispensing antiviral medications
and the pandemic influenza vaccine
Internal environment of the
general practice unit
The physical environment:
Minimising the risk of spread of influenza in the
practice setting
Structuring clinical facilities and stockpiling personal protective
equipment to enable effective infection control
Organisational environment
Reliable delivery of medications and essential equipment
to the practice
Ensuring emergency access to essential drugs, vaccines and
equipment
Ongoing communications with patients and the
health system
Strengthening capacity of communication systems
Organisational arrangements to sustain efficient and
effective services
Customising business continuity plans to the local context
Training in use of clinical decision-making tools and conducting
simulation exercises
Macro-environment of general
practice (the health system
context)
Overall organisation of the health system that will facilitate
or impede effective functioning of general practice
Integrated planning across the health system, e.g. with other
general practices and ambulatory care services, public health units
and hospitals.
Appropriate legislation, e.g. to address professional accreditation,
indemnity, and ethical concerns
Financing mechanisms for general practice
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002269.t001
Table 2. Summary of organisational levels in the five countries, the proportion of jurisdictions with accessible pandemic plans,
and coverage of primary health care in the plans
USA England Canada Australia New Zealand Total
Organisational level coordinating health system pandemic response State Primary Care
Trust
Province/Territory State/Territory District Health
Board
Number of jurisdictions/organisations oversighting pandemic
planning
51# 152 13 8 21 245
Number of publicly-available pandemic plans * (% of jurisdictions/
organisations)
49 (96) 20 (13) 8 (62) 6 (75) 6 (29) 89 (36)
Number of pandemic plans which make reference to primary health
care or ambulatory care (% of available plans)
37 (76) 20 (100) 8 (100) 5 (83) 6 (100) 76 (85)
#Includes District of Columbia
*The jurisdictions are shown in Figure S1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002269.t002
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Clinical care
Essential planning elements. This domain includes two
sets of clinical care needs. The first, prevention and treatment of
influenza, includes care for the surge in patients with acute
respiratory illness, and for people at high risk of exposure to, or
complications from, influenza. These aspects are discussed
extensively in the literature [20–23]. Most people with influenza
can be managed in the community, protecting hospitals by
delaying or avoiding admission and facilitating early discharge.
The second clinical care need is for non-influenza-related care.
General practitioners provide most chronic disease care, though
there is inter-country variation in their capacities to do this
efficiently [24,25]. While activities like cervical screening may
cease in a pandemic, chronic illnesses like diabetes or cardiac
disease will still need management. Some acute care usually
undertaken in hospitals, like acute asthma or injuries, may be
transferred to the community. In an earlier paper, we advanced a
range of models of practice to balance clinical services for
influenza and non-influenza care [16].
In the recovery phase, the clinical needs of patients are for
psychological care and chronic illness management. If the
pandemic occurs in waves, as in 1918–19, recovery activities
may need to be tempered by preparations for the next wave.
Coverage of essential elements in plans. All Canadian
and English plans outlined a role for general practice in clinical
care for influenza. While only 41% of plans from the USA
addressed clinical care for influenza by primary care practitioners
(Table 3), every US plan included guidelines on influenza
management by hospital physicians. Some plans articulated a
surge in demand for influenza care as a threat to general practice’s
survival, and proposed assessment and treatment clinics as a way
of protecting them [26,27]. In other plans [28–30] the response to
a surge was to support general practices to become more resilient
by collaborating and changing their work practices. In two US
state plans, the failure of the ambulatory care sector in the face of a
surge was assumed. The planning challenge became to find ways
to redeploy workers into other health care sectors [31,32].
Most plans were sketchy on systems to maintain non-influenza-
related clinical care, with the exception of some PCT plans, which
included activities like triage, extended prescribing, identifying
deferrable reasons for presentation, and management of more acute
problems to protect hospitals [29,33–36]. The main non-influenza
clinical area was mental health care, mentioned in six plans from the
USA [37–42] (reflecting a focus in the national plan [43]) and one
Canadian plan [44]. Coverage of the needs of vulnerable
populations– the elderly, homeless, prisoners and the psychologically
unwell – was most detailed in plans from Canada and England.
Public health responsibilities of general practice
Essential planning elements. This domain includes
surveillance of influenza-like illness and influenza virology, and
control of influenza in the general practice and the community.
Surveillance includes early diagnosis and notification, and specimen
collection to confirm clinical diagnosis and to monitor viral
characteristics and resistance to antiviral drugs. GPs and private
specialists are currently central to surveillance activities [45–48]. In
the early stages of the pandemic, it is likely that public health
authorities will undertake contact tracing to facilitate containment,
but their capacity to sustain this approach as the epidemic continues
will be limited. General practice may then be expected to include
contact tracing, and monitoring and support of people in quarantine
or home isolation. Other responsibilities may include prescribing
and dispensing antiviral drugs and participating in mass
immunisations against the pandemic strain of the virus.
Coverage of essential elements in plans. Surveillance in
general practice was mentioned in 53% of US plans and in only
33% of English plans, in all Canadian and New Zealand plans,
and all but one Australian plan (Table 3). The low rates of
coverage of surveillance in PCT plans are not in accord with the
UK plan which imputes to general practice a role in surveillance,
and recommends that PCTs operationalise this recommendation
[49]. The College of Family Physicians in Canada is a partner in
FluWatch, recruiting sentinel physicians to undertake surveillance,
so this role is well understood within the Canadian health sector.
The role of general practice in contact tracing, in monitoring
people in home isolation, and in distributing antiviral drugs is
unclear in most plans. Home care by GPs for people in quarantine
is mentioned in two US Plans [50,51], and one English plan [36],
though the recently released guidelines for PCTs anticipate a role
for general practices in home care [52]. In all country plans,
dispensing antiviral medications was generally performed by
public health units. Only 22% of PCT plans and 40% of US
Table 3. Number and rates of coverage of each of the four domains of general practice in the jurisdictional pandemic plans of the
five countries
Coverage of general practice
response domains Number of plans addressing domains (%)
USA n= 49 England n= 20 Canada n= 8 Australia n= 6 New Zealand n= 6 Total n=89
Clinical care
Influenza-related care 20 (41) 20 (100) 8 (100) 4 (66) 4 (66) 56 (63)
Non influenza related care 14 (29) 18 (90) 3 (38) 3 (50) 2 (33) 40 (45)
Public health
Surveillance 26 (53) 6 (33) 8 (100) 5 (83) 6 (100) 51 (57)
Immunisation1 15 (31) 9 (45) 3 (38) 4 (66) 2 (33) 33 (37)
Internal environment
Infection control 19 (39) 18 (90) 8 (100) 4 (66) 4 (66) 53 (60)
Macro-environment
Linkages between health services 10 (20) 19 (95) 3 (38) 3 (50) 4 (66) 39 (44)
1Includes immunisation against seasonal influenza, pneumococcal infection as well against pandemic influenza
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002269.t003
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plans mention a role for primary care in dispensing antiviral
medications. None of the Canadian plans, and only one NZ and
two Australian state plans, mentioned antiviral dispensing by
primary care. The only plan to set out contingencies when
decisions about dispensing may change was one Canadian RHA
plan [27]. Although immunisation was mentioned most frequently
after surveillance as a public health activity by general practices, in
most plans the immunisations were against pneumococcal disease
and seasonal influenza, but not mass immunisations against
pandemic influenza.
Internal environment of general practice
Essential planning elements. This domain includes the
physical environment of the general practice and its practice-level
organisation. The risk of transmission of infections within the
surgery could be minimised through separate waiting rooms and
entrances, triage and personal protective equipment and hand-
washing facilities. Hogg has outlined infections control procedures
in the practice and the associated financial costs [53]. Some
general practices (for example, those with small waiting rooms, or
only one consulting room) may be deemed too much of a
transmission risk to continue providing face-to-face services.
The practice needs to develop strategies to maintain reliable and
efficient access to essential drugs and equipment and influenza and
pneumococcal vaccines. It also needs to strengthen the capacity of its
communication technologies with patients and the broader health
system, including telephones, faxes, internet, work-from-home
technologies for staff, compatible software for sharing electronic
medical records, and recall and reminder systems for patients.
Preparation at the organisational level relates mainly to business
continuity plans. These plans should include leadership delega-
tions, staffing contingencies, safe and flexible working hours and
family care plans for staff, criteria for considering clinic closure,
recruiting and training ancillary staff, early psycho-social support,
support for making difficult clinical decisions, record keeping to
ensure accountability for actions and ‘inactions’, use of antiviral
medications, and plans for simulation exercises to complement
training, and to evaluate and refine local practice plans. Tools
[54,55] and desktop simulation exercises [19] are available to help
GPs plan for continuity.
Coverage of essential elements in plans. Infection control
strategies were well covered in plans from Canada and England,
but were mentioned in only 39% of US plans (Table 3). None of
the plans provided an inventory of fixed features, such as size and
layout of waiting room, or a single entrance, which could
compromise infection control.
Business continuity was a focus of the English plans, which
frequently referenced resources available on the UK Resilience
website [56]. This aspect of preparedness was enhanced after the
Exercise Winter Willow simulation in February 2007, and new PCT
guidelines addressing workforce planning [52]. Some PCT plans
addressed the need for general practice resilience in the face of
workforce sicknesses [33], increased aggression from patients, and
threatened loss of capacity in single doctor practices [57]. Few plans
from other countries discussed business continuity for primary care
in such detail. This may be because such issues are felt to be outside
the normal purview of state or provinces, and to be the
responsibilities of the businesses themselves or corporate interests.
Macro-environment of general practice
Essential planning elements. This domain includes the
overall organisation of, and interactions with, the health system
that will facilitate or impede effective functioning of general
practice services during a pandemic, including adaptation of
relevant regulatory and financing systems.
The health system requires a plan that adopts the ‘all-hazards
approach’ and integrates roles, responsibilities and actions for
acute clinical care, public health, and emergency management
systems [4]. This calls for coordination across general practices
and other ambulatory care services to ensure primary health care
needs within the community are effectively monitored and
addressed; with hospitals to avoid/delay hospitalisation and
facilitate early discharge; and with public health units to share
responsibilities for contact tracing, monitoring and treating people
in home isolation or quarantine, dispensing of anti-viral medica-
tions, and participation in mass immunisations against pandemic
strains of the virus (when these become available).
Neighbouring general practices and other ambulatory care
services will need local leadership with strategic approaches to
collaborate and maintain services through a pandemic. England’s
PCTs and New Zealand’s Primary Health Organisations (PHOs)
represent two ways of linking general practices under the governance
of regional boards. These networks are consolidated by financial
relationships between the PCT or the PHO and general practices.
The links between Australia’s Divisions of General Practices andGPs
are purely voluntary. In the USA, managed care systems function as
another way of linking ambulatory and hospital services. Commu-
nication infrastructure between Canada’s family practitioners, 25%
of whom are solo practitioners [58], is still being developed, as is the
incorporation of general practice into Canada’s Pan-Canadian
Public Health Network [59].
The regulatory environment includes accreditation of retired
medical practitioners and allied health professionals, laws and
regulations which support or hinder the flow of qualified personnel
across a jurisdiction’s health facilities [48], and ensuring an
appropriate medicolegal framework to support clinical decisions
on prioritising medical care during a pandemic, for example,
modifying clinical standards, deferring treatment, and restricting
access to certain treatments.
Funding mechanisms for general practice may impact upon the
capacity to provide extra services. In countries with fee-for-service
payment systems, general practices may profit from a surge in
attendances, but may equally run into business difficulties if they
are short-staffed for prolonged periods. GPs funded through a
capitated system may have more freedom to alter their practice to
provide different service mixes.
In the post-event phase, patients and GPs may require support
for psychological recovery. It may be necessary to provide some
formal relief through a system of locum GPs from areas less
affected by the pandemic. Organisational partnerships at this stage
may need to be with social services and mental health support
services.
Coverage of essential elements in plans. Countries with
mechanisms for linking general practices with other sectors were
more likely to address networking in their plans. Ninety five per
cent of English plans addressed systems to support collaboration
between general practices (Table 3). These plans addressed buddy
systems, practice networks, and contingency plans for communities
of practice. Four of the six New Zealand plans also addressed
collaboration, though only one in significant detail; this plan
outlined a distinction between key practices, and other practices
which might decide to partner one another [55]. Of the three
Canadian provincial plans that addressed collaboration, the most
comprehensive was from Quebec, which identified a need to
bridge the gap between salaried practitioners and independent
physicians. The plan of the Montreal Regional Authority [60]
operationalises this by setting up a system of active and sustained
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outreach by the public health department to independent
physicians.
The absence of plans for networking between general practice
and public health is most marked in the USA. With the exception
of Louisiana [61], US plans which mentioned networking did so in
one line, generally advocating partnership between private and
public services without indicating how this might occur.
Louisiana’s strategic approach built a participatory structure for
rural practitioners through a partnership between the state public
health department and the Bureau of Primary Rural Health Care.
The Canadian national pandemic plan [62] is framed around a
set of ethical precepts incorporated into pandemic planning at the
provincial and regional health level. The UK has recently released
an ethical framework for policy and planning, though this has not
yet been incorporated into planning documents [63]. The
regulatory framework most mentioned was in relation to
credentialing for retired GPs and other volunteers [33,64,65],
and less frequently, indemnity [36]. Although most plans include
coverage of the relevant public health legislation, no country’s plan
included an inventory of legislation relevant to general practice
that might need to be amended.
Only one plan [66] and the PCT guidelines [52], canvas the
potential of recompense for financial loss to a general practice.
The only country in which the planning level coincided with the
level that made decisions about funding of health care was
Canada. One regional health authority plan provided an outline of
specific issues likely to affect physicians, and raised the possibility
of reviewing funding mechanisms in a pandemic [67]. There
appear to be no ancillary plans addressing principles of altered
funding for private physicians in a pandemic.
Discussion
This is the first study to provide a framework that brings
together multiple functions, structural relationships and the
responsiveness of general practice to prepare for pandemic
influenza. The framework provides clarity of purpose and a
structure to guide planning through four functional domains:
clinical care, public health responsibilities, and the internal and
macro environments of general practice. The domains have been
structured as integral components of a complex system that can
respond to uncertainty [68] and be adapted for a given local
setting and health system context.
We draw three conclusions regarding general practice from our
analysis. First, none of the 89 jurisdictional plans addressed all
domains of the general practice response during a pandemic.
Second, while many aspects of the first three domains are included
in plans for general practice, there are critical gaps and
inconsistencies in the fourth domain (macro-environment) that
render some elements of the jurisdictional plan ungrounded or
unrealistic. Third, few plans addressed the broader ambulatory
care context, including the need to engage private specialists and
other allied health professionals [48].
Planning and implementing change across the health system is
complex. Targeting individual sectors for change (e.g. public
health departments, hospitals or general practices) without
securing reciprocal changes and strengthening inter-relationships
across the health system, is unlikely to succeed [10,18]. Planners
must consider how connectivity across the health system might be
strengthened to enable optimal use of general practice resources
for planning [68]. While this may be challenging, particularly in
countries with weak governance structures for primary health care,
omitting general practice input into the planning process may be
considered unethical [69] and counterproductive.
Limitations of the study: Our findings are exploratory rather than
definitive, and indicate directions for further planning and
research. Like any new tool, the framework and its application
in a given context needs testing and refinement through simulation
exercises targeting ambulatory care services as well as the broader
health system.
Planning is an evolving activity that reflects a ‘map’ rather than
a ‘destination’, and our findings provide a snapshot of the plans
accessible in late 2007. The scope and content of the plans will
change over time, as seen in two countries that adjusted their plans
after simulation exercises, Exercise Cumpston in Australia [70]
and Winter Willow in the UK [71]. Interestingly, the former
identified specific weaknesses in the involvement of the primary
health care sector and made recommendations to better integrate
primary health care providers into planning at the national and
jurisdictional levels [70]. National and sub-national pandemic
plans may be intended to provide a strategic focus and not to
elaborate on operational activities; it is possible the latter may have
been addressed, but were not accessible at the time of our study.
Another potential limitation of our study is that the gaps we
identified in many plans were grounded in theories about the ways to
enhance the quality and outcomes of clinical care [10,18] or of
public health preparedness planning [6]. The science of prepared-
ness planning is still maturing [4–6] and there is relatively little
systematic evidence for linking specific preparedness structures to the
ability to implement efficient and effective responses [5,6].
Two important limitations to the implementation of prepared-
ness activities are uncertainties in knowing how much prepared-
ness is enough [5] and in having a measurable assessment of the
outcomes of preparedness activities. It may be more meaningful to
perceive of the activities as a ‘preparedness production system’ in
which a variety of processes and activities have been completed to
prepare for an optimal response [6]. We are unable to comment
on the extent to which these preparedness plans have been
implemented, except in the case of those jurisdictions which have
held pandemic exercises [70,71]. General practice response is
rarely tested in pandemic exercises, which tend to focus on
hospital and public health responses. A notable exception is
Operation Sparrowhawk in Singapore, where the feasibility of
general practice influenza clinics was tested [72]
The Haddon matrix is not a final check-list for preparedness
planning but a problem-solving tool used as a starting framework
for planning. The contents of each cell of the matrix help identify a
particular problem or challenge that needs to be addressed. We
recognise that the challenges will be neither static over time, nor
uniform across general practices; responses will have to be
modified in the context of the general practice setting as the
pandemic evolves and as other parts of health system, particularly
hospitals and public health units respond to the epidemic.
Implications of our study for primary health care in developing countries:
Endemic and epidemic infectious diseases inflict high levels of
morbidity and mortality in developing countries because of a
combination of poor living conditions, effects of multiple
concurrent illnesses particularly in children, fragile national health
systems, overburdened and overstressed health workers, and
negative work environments [73]. Although our study targeted
general practice in developed countries, the conceptual framework
we developed (Table 1) can be used by primary health care
services in developing countries to deconstruct the multi-
dimensional challenges posed by pandemic influenza. Identifying
possible solutions and apportioning responsibilities across compo-
nents of the health system is more complex. Operational guidelines
have been developed for the detection and rapid containment of a
potentially pandemic strain of influenza to the epicentre of the
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outbreak [74], for example, if this were to occur in a South East
Asian country. However, because of the immense global
implications of such an event, this intensive strategy will need to
be supported by extraordinary resources from the global
community, an action not sustainable once the pandemic strain
spreads beyond the initial epicentre.
In an analysis of pandemic influenza plans in Asia-Pacific
countries in 2006, Coker found that although all countries
recognised the importance of pandemic planning, operational
responsibility particularly at the local level, remained unclear; most
plans relied on specialised flu hospitals, while few developed the
possibility of caring for patients at home [75]. (The study made no
reference to primary health care or the private practice sector). In his
analysis of public health emergencies in developing countries,
Quarantelli identified relatively poor adaptive capabilities to be the
key barrier to effective responses at the central and local levels [76].
Possible reasons included poorer public health infrastructures and
human and financial resources, organisational structures that
functioned mainly in a top-down manner with a strong emphasis
on structures more than functions, and lack of planning initiatives the
further away one moved from central level [76].
Many poor countries already have a health crisis, and need
massive international investments, including mobilisation and
strengthening of human resources to build sustainable health
systems, strong leadership and political commitment [73]. In the
face of the pandemic threat, primary health care in developing
countries will need resources to develop a suite of policies,
including: clarification of what essential primary health care will
continue through a pandemic, developing health workforce plans
that may entail diverting clinicians from other areas of the health
workforce, establishing non-hierarchical links between primary
health care, hospitals and public health, and injecting funds into
hospital and primary care preparedness simultaneously.
Enhancing the role of general practice in pandemic
planning
It may be argued that the absence of general practice elements
from pandemic plans is not problematic, that it is outside the
responsibility of public health departments that do not have a
governance role for general practice. We argue instead that the
general practice sector, which is characterised by loose networks
between ambulatory care services, and often lacks the appropriate
organisational structure and mandate, cannot spearhead many
elements of planning for primary care. This calls for actions by
health departments as well as by general practices.
Actions by health departments. Ensuring that the
community receives appropriate health care during public health
emergencies is a government responsibility. Consequently, health
departments must emphasise in national and sub-national plans,
the critical need for all levels of the health system to integrate the
general practice sector in the planning process. This should
include appropriate general practice representation in high level
planning and decision-making committees, in incident-command-
control structures and in the management of community-based
specialised clinics such as ‘fever clinics’ or ‘community information
and assessment centres’.
Good planning must focus on the planning process rather than the
production of a written document [76]. The process includes
collaborative activities such as meetings, drills, exercises, simulations,
developing techniques for training, knowledge transfer, identifying
and obtaining resource materials, and continually updating materials
and strategies. These planning activities are important not only
because they inform, but because they also foster collaborative
learning and problem-solving, and generate an atmosphere of
mutual trust and solidarity among people who will be affected by a
pandemic and whose collaboration will be essential in the response.
The willing general practitioner sector [7,8] is an essential
resource for extending the surge capacity of health departments.
Health departments should harness and support interactions and
networking among general practices, and between them and
ambulatory health care providers, hospitals and public health
units. The role of general practice in contact tracing, monitoring
and treating people in home isolation or quarantine, dispensing
antiviral drugs and participating in mass vaccinations - omitted in
most plans - needs to be clarified. In addition, health departments
should modify or adopt where appropriate, legislation and
financing mechanisms to enable general practices to function
optimally during the pandemic.
Action to support planning by general practice. While the
diversity of the general practice sector means that there will not be
guidelines to cover all scenarios and contexts, a coherent approach
would enable multi-actor accountability and more efficient,
contextual planning by jurisdictions. The guidelines for PCTs [52]
are an example of such an approach, designed for a particular health
system. They could act as a useful point of departure for planning
integrated general practice plans by other health systems.
There is a need for a system of sharing innovations and
exemplary solutions to challenges for pandemic planning by
general practice, analogous to those targeting mainly hospitals and
public health departments [77]. Given the diversity in organisation
of general practice systems, a web presence comparing exemplary
approaches from different health systems would be a useful
resource for planners.
Implications for research
An important challenge will be ensuring collaboration and
coordination across the health sector during a pandemic. Research
is needed to identify the prevailing barriers and facilitators to
effective collaboration across the health sector, how these may
change under the stressor of a pandemic, and how this information
could be used to optimise the response.
The regulatory environment is founded on a set of ethical
principles, often unarticulated. Since there is likely to be some
dispute between utilitarian philosophical approaches used in
public health and deontological or virtue ethical approaches used
in clinical medicine [78], there is a need for some preparatory
work with general practitioners clarifying ethics of clinical
behaviour, restriction of liberty under quarantine orders, and
resource allocation and distribution.
In an established pandemic, it is likely that there will be shortfalls
in the GP workforce, due to illness among GPs, caring duties or
closure of small practices. Non-hospital clinical specialists, retired
general practitioners, allied health professionals andmedical students
could be trained to fill the gap in services. Research is needed to
define the clinical work that can be done by other health personnel in
general practice, eligibility criteria and accreditation processes for
this cadre of workers, and optimal training processes.
Conclusions
All public health problems have a clinical dimension, and all
clinical problems have a public health dimension. At present, the
plans in the five countries provide more detail on the public health
dimension of the pandemic. There are intercountry differences in
the emphases provided to different domains of the general practice
response. Some of this reflects the emphasis on particular elements
contained within the relevant national plan. Some of the
differences are due to the ways in which general practice is
structured in a country, and the strengths of its linkages to other
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components of the health sector. There is an urgent need to
incorporate general practice and the broader primary care sector
into pandemic planning activities, and to undertake the prepared-
ness activities that would make this sector, which provides the
majority of health care work, a true partner in pandemic response.
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